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Using panel regression for the period 1970-2000 the paper analyzes whether globalization has 
influenced the OECD countries’ social and overall spending as well as their tax rates on labor, 
consumption and capital. Accounting for potential endogeneity of the regressors, the results 
show that globalization (measured by an index covering 23 variables) did not generally 
decrease the leeway for independent economic policy. Globalization even increased implicit 
tax rates on capital (as calculated by Carey and Rabesona 2002) – a result that is mainly 
driven by economic integration. However, there seems to be competition over tax rates on 
capital when data based on legislation as suggested by Devereux and Griffith (2003) is 
employed. Depending on the method of estimation, increasing social integration also 
influences policies, while political integration does not matter for economic policy in most 
specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
Critics of globalization claim that increasing economic integration is responsible for 
reduced social spending and a shift in the tax burden from capital to labor. Whether economic 
globalization indeed influences policy has been analyzed in numerous empirical studies. The 
results, however, are far from being conclusive. According to Swank (2001) and Adserà and 
Boix (2002) globalization increases the tax burden while Rodrik (1997) and Vaubel (1999) 
show that globalization goes along with decreased tax revenue. Garrett (1995) and Heinemann 
(2000) do not find any significant influence of globalization on revenue.
1 Whereas Garrett 
(1995), Quinn (1997) and Swank (2001) show that globalization leads to higher corporate 
taxes, Hansson and Olofsdotter (2003) report the opposite result. The effect of globalization 
on social spending is equally disputed: Hicks and Swank (1992) and Vaubel (1999) report a 
significantly positive, Swank (2001) as well as Garrett and Mitchell (1999) a significantly 
negative relationship. 
In the above-mentioned studies, the influence of globalization has been measured by 
the extent of capital controls, openness to trade or the amount of foreign direct investment. In 
doing so, a possible influence of political integration has been neglected. With rising political 
integration, however, transnational enterprises will find it more difficult to circumvent 
national regulation. If rising economic integration goes along with more political integration, 
these effects could cancel each other out. The estimates of economic integration as reported in 
previous studies would then be biased. Similar arguments can be applied to social integration. 
Without capital restrictions, competition in taxes and expenditure is more likely the closer the 
potential host country’s culture is to that of the source country and the easier it is to exchange 
information. This social dimension of globalization could therefore be important for economic 
policy as well. 
 
1 Schulze and Ursprung (1999) summarize theoretical and empirical work on this topic.   3
 
                                                          
Most previous empirical studies, like those of Garrett (1995), Quinn (1997) and Swank 
(2001), proxied the degree of tax competition using tax revenues. However, even if tax rates 
are decreasing, an improved economic environment could raise revenues. This would conceal 
existing tax competition (Schulze and Ursprung 1999: 316). Simply taking statutory tax rates 
instead would not substantially improve the analysis. This is because the tax burden also 
depends on tax bases. Since tax-exempt amounts, depreciation rules and other tax benefits 
differ largely across countries, even with similar gross incomes tax bases would be different. 
To account for this, the more recent studies (Bretschger and Hettich 2002, Hansson and 
Olofsdotter 2003, among others) employ average effective tax rates. According to this 
method, which has initially been suggested by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), actual tax 
revenue is expressed in relation to the tax base causing this revenue. This implicitly accounts 
for the effects of different tax benefits.
2 Therefore, I will use such tax rates here. The 
robustness of the results is tested, however, by employing marginal and average effective tax 
rates based on an analysis of the legislation underlying different tax regimes (“adjusted 
statutory rates”). 
From a policy perspective, of course, the influences of individual elements of 
globalization on economic policy are important. However, most elements of globalization are 
highly correlated, so that it is impossible to include them all individually in one regression. 
Omitting dimensions, on the other hand, causes biased coefficients. Using aggregate 
indicators of globalization is thus preferable. In any case, only an aggregate measure can be 
used to study the overall effect of globalization. This is what is done in this paper. 
The article contributes to the literature in testing econometrically the overall influence 
of globalization as well as the individual effects of economic, political and social integration 
on the OECD countries’ economic policy. It is analyzed whether and to what extent 
globalization influences government’s social and overall spending as well as implicit tax rates 
 
2 For an excellent discussion of tax ratios see Volkerink, Sturm and de Haan (2001), Volkerink and de Haan   4
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
on labor, consumption and capital. For the first time in such analysis, potential endogeneity of 
the explanatory variables is accounted for. 
In addition to the covariates that are common in the literature, my regression analysis 
employs an index of globalization and its different components as independent variables. This 
index has been developed in Dreher (2003) for 123 countries. It is based on 23 variables that 
relate to different dimensions of globalization. The variables have been combined to six 
groups: actual flows of trade and investment, restrictions, variables measuring the degree of 
political integration, data quantifying the extent of personal contact with people living in 
foreign countries, data measuring transborder flows of information and a proxy for cultural 
integration. These dimensions have been combined to three sub-indices and one overall index 
of globalization with an objective statistical method – exactly the same method that has been 
applied by Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000) in the construction of their well-known 
economic freedom index.
3 Table 1 reports the individual components. As can be seen, 
economic, political, and social integration obtained roughly equal weights.
4 Table 2 contains 
results for the overall index of globalization for the period 1975-2000 as well as the three sub-
indices in 2000.
5
Employing this proxy, what I find is, basically, that globalization increased average 
effective tax rates on capital and did not influence the other policy instruments analyzed in 
this study. When adjusted statutory tax rates on capital are employed, the results show that 
increasing globalization reduces taxes. 
 
(2002) and de Haan, Sturm and Volkerink (2003). 
3 Appendix A describes this method in more detail. For a recent discussion of the concept and measurement of 
the economic freedom index see Gwartney and Lawson (2003). 
4 Note that the underlying method attributes smaller weights to individual components, the more components of 
one category are included. Comparing the results for McDonald’s restaurants and fdi, e.g., does therefore not 
mean that restaurants are more important than fdi. If the analysis would include more cultural indicators, 
individual weights would be lower. 
5 A priori, one might have expected smaller countries to be more globalized. The high value of the index for the 
USA is, however, due to high political and cultural integration with the rest of the world. The latter appears, 
because cultural globalization is usually defined as proximity to the USA (see Dreher 2003).   5
 
                                                          
The next section discusses potential influences of globalization on economic policy. 
Whether increasing integration indeed has an impact on the policy of the OECD countries is 
examined in Section 3. To this end, I present combined time-series cross-section analysis for 
the last 30 years. Section 4 discusses various tests for robustness, while the final section 
summarizes results. 
 
2. Potential influences of globalization on economic policy 
There are many ways to confine international political competition. While national 
restrictions of international transactions have been drastically reduced since the eighties, 
agreements among governments – be it in the form of harmonized taxes, be it in the form of 
joint standards – became more frequent.
6 These developments cannot be judged in isolation. 
Following Vaubel (1999: 283), trade liberalization can easily be explained from a public 
choice perspective. Economic integration increases efficiency and thus productivity and 
income. In the short run, with tax rates constant this increases tax revenue. As politicians’ 
time horizon is usually rather short, they are thus in favor of trade liberalization. Similarly, 
liberalization of capital account restrictions potentially improves the allocation.
7 With rising 
presence of foreign suppliers and investors, resistance against barriers to market entry rises 
(Peltzman 1989), which enables the reduction of such regulations (Vaubel 1999: 284). The 
resulting economic integration potentially increases political competition among governments 
– and this might endanger governments’ revenue. The more political competition increases, 
thus, the more governments are interested in political integration (Vaubel 1990). The 
dismantling of economic restrictions therefore leads to more cooperation in politics, since 
politicians want to retain their leeway in economic policy. 
 
6 In the late nineties there have been initiatives to prevent “harmful“ tax competition in the EU as well as in the 
OECD (Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano 2002: 2). See also European Commission (1998), OECD (1998) and 
van der Hoek (2003). 
7 Tax revenue can, however, decline in capital exporting countries.   6
 
                                                          
The relationship between economic integration and economic policy has been 
frequently analyzed in the empirical literature. The (simplified) line of reasoning is as 
follows:
8 Higher economic integration induces mobile factors of production to migrate to the 
country with the lowest taxes. In order to maintain their tax bases, governments might engage 
in competition for the lowest tax rates and therefore reduce tax rates on capital (“race to the 
bottom“). Since as a consequence revenues decline, the state’s capacity to redistribute is also 
lower and expenditures decline as well. The international competition might thus confine the 
governments’ scope for spending (“disciplining hypothesis”).
9
The disciplining hypothesis has, however, also been questioned. Apolte (2001) shows 
that Leviathan governments might not be sufficiently restricted by economic integration. 
Baldwin and Krugman (2000), Kind et al. (2000) and Ludema and Wooton (2000) show that 
reduced transport costs can increase agglomeration forces. Linkages among producers and 
between producers and consumers lead to the agglomeration of production. As long as the 
benefits from agglomeration exceed the costs imposed by taxation, globalization increases 
governments’ leeway to tax mobile factors. Economic integration might thus lead to higher 
tax rates on capital.
10
In the absence of (sufficient) agglomeration forces the government might try to 
develop new sources of revenue as an alternative to reducing expenditures in the wake of 
international competition. To this end, the more immobile tax bases are better suited. One 
would thus expect that taxes on labor and consumption rise with economic globalization. 
Governments could, however, also react to the increasing stress of competition with 
increasing political integration. They might prevent competition, for example, with 
(unofficial) agreements. They could decide on a minimum tax rate, as has been done, e.g., in 
the EU with VAT rates. As another example, European Commissioner Monti (1998) argues in 
 
8 For a review of theoretical models on tax competition in the EU see Krogstrup (2002). See also Schulze and 
Ursprung (1999) and Wilson and Wildasin (2004). 
9 See, e.g., Brennan and Buchanan (1980).   7
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
favor of tax coordination, since otherwise labor would be penalized for being less mobile as 
compared to capital. 
If economic integration indeed fosters political integration, those two dimensions of 
globalization might be highly correlated.
11 If political integration – as has been done in all 
previous empirical studies – is not accounted for, the estimated effect of globalization 
represents the joint effect of both dimensions. Since the effect of the two dimensions might go 
in opposite directions, this could result in an insignificant coefficient. If the political effect 
exceeds the economic effect, this could also explain the above-mentioned results of Garrett 
(1995), Quinn (1997) and Swank (2001), showing a positive impact of globalization on 
corporate taxes. A country’s degree of political integration with the rest of the world therefore 
necessarily has to be included in an analysis of economic integration. The same is true for 
technical and cultural aspects, which are probably highly correlated with economic integration 
as well.
12 If the coefficients estimated in previous studies mainly reflect technological changes 
or increasing cultural proximity instead of measuring the true influence of economic 
integration, recommendations derived from those studies are meaningless. 
These considerations lead to the following hypotheses: Economic integration induces 
tax competition. However, tax rates on capital do only decrease if agglomeration forces do not 
offset the pressure on taxes (and might increase otherwise). Without significant 
agglomeration, tax rates on labor and consumption are expected to rise as a consequence of 
economic integration. When the effects of agglomeration dominate, tax rates on consumption 
and labor are not expected to rise (or might even decline). 
Total government expenditures are expected to decrease as a consequence of economic 
integration (when political competition actually confines the governments’ leeway). Again, 
however, the presence of significant agglomeration forces might allow for an increase in 
 
10 See Wilson and Wildasin (2004) for a detailed discussion. 
11 In fact, the correlation between the indices of political and economic integration employed in this study is 
0.20.   8
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
expenditures. The same is probably true for social spending. In any case, social spending 
could also rise with globalization if governments expand the welfare state in order to insure 
their citizens against the risks of globalization („compensation hypothesis“).  
Political integration, on the other hand, can be used to confine competition. Such 
integration is therefore likely to increase tax rates, since it is no longer possible to compare 
the situation in one country with those in others and exit strategies become less feasible. This 
reduced competition might also lead to higher government total and social spending.  
In terms of social integration, likely influences are less clear. On the one hand, higher 
cultural integration facilitates migration. Differences in tax burdens or expenditures can then 
more easily lead to exit. The resulting increased competition should be reflected in lower tax 
rates (and therefore lower expenditure). On the other hand, cultural integration can make a 
country more attractive to foreign investment. This could even increase the governments’ 
leeway to raise taxes and spending. 
The next section analyzes econometrically whether the results of previous studies can 
be confirmed or invalidated if the analysis does not only account for economic, but also for 
political and social integration. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
In order to test whether and to what extent globalization affected the OECD countries’ 
economic policy, I estimate combined cross-section time-series regressions. The dependent 
variables are total and social spending relative to GDP and average effective tax rates on 
labor, consumption and capital. The average effective tax rates are calculated in Carey and 
Rabesona (2002) and are a variant of the original Mendoza et al. (1994) data. All data are 
averages over five years – they cover the period 1970-2000. Since some of the data are not 
 
12 Correlation between the indices of social and economic integration is 0.58.   9
available for all 30 OECD countries or all periods, the panel data are unbalanced and the 
number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables.
13 I found significant 
fixed country and period effects in all specifications. However, the coefficients of the country 
and time effects are not reported in the tables. All standard errors are estimated robustly. All 
variables, their precise definitions and data sources are listed in the Appendix. 
For each policy variable the system of equations to be estimated is 
yy G X it it it it i t it =+ + + + + + − α β γ η η η ε 1 ''  (1) 
with y being the different policy measures, G representing the globalization indices, X 
being a vector of control variables, and whereηi is a country fixed effect, andηt is a period 
fixed effect. 
Table 3 reports the results when β  in (1) is restricted to zero. Since I found significant 
first-order autocorrelation in all models, the disturbance term is modeled as an AR(1) process. 
The same explanatory variables are employed to explain each policy variable. I start 
explaining the different dependent variables with the overall index of globalization. The 
second column adds variables that have been shown to be significant in previous studies: The 
share of under 15-year old and over 64-year old people relative to population, the rate of 
unemployment, the share of government employees in all employees (Razin, Sadka and 
Swagel 2002), a dummy for left wing governments (Vaubel 1999), economic growth and a 
proxy for the costs of international trade (Hansson and Olofsdotter 2003). 
The dependency ratio controls for demographic factors. With a higher dependency 
ratio, taxes and expenditures are also expected to be higher. Regarding expenditures and taxes 
on capital and consumption, the same is true for unemployment. However, with respect to 
taxes on labor, a negative coefficient is expected. The share of government employment in 
total employment indicates the breadth of government involvement in the economy, and is 
expected to increase taxes and expenditures. Left governments are more likely to tax capital 
                                                           
 
13 Results for a balanced panel are discussed in Section 4.   10
 
and usually have a higher preference for bigger states than central or right wing governments 
do. Expenditures and taxes are thus expected to be higher when left governments hold office. 
This is especially true for taxes on capital. 
In the tax competition literature, economic growth is expected to reduce tax rates on 
capital (e.g. Hansson and Olofsdotter 2003), while expenditures are likely to increase at times 
of economic prosperity. With respect to the consumption and labor tax rates, the impact of 
growth could be in either direction. Reductions in the costs of international trade increase the 
importance of agglomeration forces and are thus expected to lead to increases in tax rates (and 
expenditures). This is because the resulting decrease in factor mobility allows governments to 
increase tax rates (see Hansson and Olofsdotter 2003 for a detailed discussion). 
The results are presented in Table 3. As can be seen (and in line with our a priori 
hypothesis), higher unemployment leads to significantly higher government total and social 
expenditures. However, contradicting our expectations, tax rates on labor are significantly 
higher as well. This might reflect reversed causality, as higher labor taxes probably imply 
rising unemployment. In fact, unemployment no longer significantly affects taxes on labour 
when the lagged value is employed instead of the contemporaneous one. The problem of 
endogeneity will be discussed in the context of Arellano-Bond estimation below. 
The results also show that a greater public sector (as measured by government 
employees relative to total employees) increases total government expenses, with a coefficient 
significant at the one percent level. Higher economic growth reduces overall and social 
expenditure but has no effect on taxes. Again, the impact on social and total spending is 
probably due to reversed causality. In fact, the coefficient is significantly positive if the 
lagged value of growth is included in the regressions instead of the contemporaneous value. 
In order to proxy the costs of international trade I follow Hansson and Olofsdotter 
(2003) who employ imports including costs for insurance and freight relative to imports free 
on board. As the results show, this proxy is insignificant in all regressions. Arguably, the   11
 
insignificance of the proxy for costs of trade might result from the presence of the index of 
globalization in the regressions. As discussed, the index of globalization might also be a 
proxy for reduced transaction costs, leading to agglomeration. When the index of 
globalization is excluded from the regressions, however, the coefficient remains insignificant 
in all regressions. 
The governments’ political leaning and the dependency ratio are also insignificant in 
all regression. 
While globalization does not significantly influence government spending, taxes on 
labor and on consumption, the results show that taxes on capital depend significantly on 
globalization (when the other variables are also included). As the results show, taxes on 
capital do significantly increase with globalization. The issue will be further investigated 
below. 
Table 4 replicates the analysis for the dynamic model of equation (1), containing the 
lagged endogenous variable. The lagged dependent variable is included, because government 
spending and taxes change only slowly over time instead of being changed instantaneously. 
These changes might entail some adjustment costs on the private sector or might be politically 
blocked by interest groups (Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano 2002: 4). However, in the 
presence of fixed country effects the OLS estimator is inconsistent. To deal with this, I 
employ the GMM estimator as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) in addition. This 
estimator first-differences the estimating equation and uses lags of the dependent variable 
from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments. 
Since there are more instruments than right-hand side variables, the equations are over-
identified and instruments must be weighted in an appropriate way. I only present results from 
the Arellano-Bond one-step estimator, which uses the identity matrix as a weighting matrix. 
The two-step estimator weighs the instruments asymptotically efficiently using the GMM1   12
 
estimates. However, in small samples like the one used here, standard errors tend to be under-
estimated by the two-step estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991: 291).  
As Table 4 shows, inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable to the OLS regressions 
does not change most of the results. However, applying the Arellano-Bond estimator leads to 
a dramatic loss of observations, since information from two periods is discarded by 
differencing and instrumenting. This results in generally lower t-statistics. A smaller share of 
working-age people relative to population now significantly reduces total government 
spending and (when estimated with OLS) taxes on capital. While the Arellano-Bond test of 
second-order autocorrelation accepts the specification at the one percent level, the Sargan-test, 
which amounts to a test of the exogeneity of the explanatory variables, rejects the 
overidentifying restrictions in the regression explaining overall government expenditure. 
Therefore, I performed estimations treating all right-hand side variables as predetermined 
instead of strictly exogenous (not reported in the table). The results are unchanged (and both 
specification tests now accept the instruments). The dependency ratio’s counterintuitive 
impact is in line with the results of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2000). In their explanation, the 
negative coefficient reflects an increase of the anti-tax coalition in an aging society. 
Unemployment does no longer significantly influence taxes on labor. In the OLS-
regression, higher economic growth significantly reduces taxes on labor. When estimated with 
GMM, the results also show that taxes on consumption are higher if a left government holds 
office. This relationship is significant at the five-percent-level. At the ten percent level, higher 
costs of trade reduce taxes on labor (when estimated with OLS), which is in line with the a 
priori hypothesis. Also at the ten percent level, taxes on capital rise with the share of 
government employment in total employment. The lagged endogenous variable is significant 
in most OLS specifications and always insignificant when estimated with GMM. 
Most importantly, the results with respect to the index of globalization are in most 
cases unchanged. This gives rise to the conclusion that the globalization of the last 30 years   13
 
                                                          
did not have a major influence on tax rates and expenditure policy in OECD countries, the 
only exception being tax rates on capital that did increase with globalization. This effect is 
significant at the five-percent-level in the OLS regression. It is still significant at the ten-
percent-level when estimated with GMM. The results show that tax rates on capital rise by 
about three percentage points with an increase in the index by one point. Since the index of 
globalization is scaled arbitrarily, it is not sensible to interpret the absolute magnitudes of the 
coefficients. However, according to the estimates the increasing integration of, e.g., Canada 
with the rest of the world from 1985 to 1995 or Norway’s from 1980 to 2000 is responsible 
for an increase in average effective tax rates on capital of about three percentage points 
each.
14 Increasing the index value from its lowest value of 1.6 for Turkey in 1985 to its 
highest value of 6.5 for the US in the year 2000 increases tax rates on capital by 16.4 
percentage points according to the OLS regressions and 13.4 percentage points when 
estimated with GMM. 
The results lead to the conclusion that there has been no erosion in tax rates on capital 
following globalization. A look at graph 1 shows that the positive relation between the index 
of globalization and tax rates on capital is rather obvious. The simple correlation is 0.7, which 
is, of course, highly significant.  
In what follows, I assess which dimensions of globalization are responsible for the 
derived relationship and whether individual sub-indices have a significant influence in spite of 
the overall insignificance. Instead of the overall index of globalization the three sub-indices 
are included in the regressions. Again, notice that the small sample size makes the GMM 
estimates merely suggestive. 
Table 5 reports the results. As can be seen, the disaggregated analysis confirms the 
previous estimates: In almost all cases the coefficients of the globalization variables are 
completely insignificant. Again, the tax rate on capital is the only exception. The results show 
 
14 In fact, the increase has been 7.69 and, respectively, 0.61 percentage points.   14
 
                                                          
that economic integration increases these taxes, with a coefficient significant at the ten 
percent level when estimated with OLS and, respectively, the five percent level in the GMM 
estimation. The positive coefficient of the overall index of globalization reported in Tables 3 
and 4 does thus not arise because the impact of political integration dominates those of 
economic integration. 
This result is compatible with theoretical arguments outlined in Section 2 and previous 
empirical research. Quinn (1997) and Rodrik (1997) find that the capital tax burden is 
positively related to integration. Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002) show that a 
county’s openness increases average tax rates on several classes of investment. Krogstrup 
(2003) reports capital taxes to increase significantly with capital account liberalization (as 
measured by Quinn’s 14-point index).
15  
There are several possibilities to explain the positive correlation between capital taxes 
and globalization. First, and in line with the hypothesis developed in Section 2, the positive 
influence of economic integration on capital taxes might be due to agglomeration effects (with 
the index of globalization being a better proxy for the costs of trade as the proxy based on 
imports c.i.f. and imports f.o.b.).  
Second, this result supports the political economy literature arguing increased 
globalization moves the median voter to the left. This is not contradicted by the insignificance 
of the dummy for left governments in most regressions since it might well be that all parties 
moved to the left, which would not be reflected by the dummy. 
Third, the globalization index could be correlated with a general upward trend in 
overall tax revenues at the same time. The index would then capture the overall trend in tax 
 
15 All these results are contrary to Genschel (2001) who argues that the increasing tax competition due to 
globalization considerably decreased governments’ leeway for independent policy. Although Genschel concedes 
that taxes on capital did on average not decrease he claims they would nevertheless be higher without 
integration, since the economic environment deteriorated. My analysis refutes this conjecture since it controls for 
the economic environment.   15
 
revenues instead of capturing the effect of globalization. Like in Krogstrup (2003), however, 
adding overall tax revenues (as a percent of GDP) to the regression does not change the result.  
And finally, the result might be due to omitted variables bias. Inclusion of additional 
plausible covariates like a country’s per capita GDP does, however, not change the result.  
The influence of social integration on capital taxes is less clear. In the within-groups 
specification, the relationship is positive and significant at the five-percent-level. Social 
integration seems to increase a country’s attractiveness, which increases leeway for increasing 
taxes. When estimated with GMM, however, the coefficient looses its significance. The 
results also show that political integration does not matter for economic policy. 
The next section discusses the robustness of these results and presents extensions. 
 
4. Further Discussion 
There are four important issues that have not been investigated so far. The first issue is 
the lack of data for some variables and the resulting unbalanced panel. To test whether the 
lack of a significant impact of the index of globalization on expenditures, labor taxes and 
consumption taxes is due to a different dependent variable or a different sample, I replicate all 
regressions employing a balanced sample instead. As it turns out, this has almost no impact on 
the results reported in the tables. There are three exceptions: The impact of the index of 
globalization on capital taxes is significant at the ten percent level in the balanced sample 
even when no control variables are included. Also at the ten percent level, social expenditures 
are lower with rising economic integration (in the OLS specification of Table 5) and taxes on 
capital are higher with higher social integration (in the GMM specification of Table 5). 
Second, as a potential shortcoming of the procedure used to derive the globalization 
indices, changes in the index over time might to some extent reflect missing data instead of 
real changes in globalization (Dreher 2003). To examine this shortcoming an alternative 
procedure to derive the index has been used as well: In those years where no data for some   16
categories exist, the latest data available have been employed for constructing the indices. 
Changes in the index over time therefore only reflect changes in the underlying data. The 
main results of the analysis are unchanged. 
Third, as has been pointed out by Volkerink, Sturm and de Haan (2001), and Carey 
and Rabesona (2002), plausible changes in the definitions of tax ratios can lead to 
substantially changed results. To test for the robustness of the result regarding capital 
taxation, I therefore replicate the regressions, using three alternative measures of the tax 
burden. The first is taken from Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and is a different application of 
the Mendoza et al. (1994) methodology. The second and the third have been constructed by 
Devereux and Griffith (2003) and are based on an analysis of the legislation underlying the 
tax regimes. I focus on their base cases for the effective average tax rate and the effective 
marginal tax rate. 
As one additional problem with the regressions presented so far, fourth, tax rates and 
government spending in a particular country might depend on tax rates and spending in other 
countries rather than (or in addition to) being dependent on globalization. Following 




yR y X it i it it ,, (, = −− 1  (2) 
with   being the vector of tax rates and, respectively, expenditures in all other 
countries at time t-1. Clearly, this equation cannot be estimated given available degrees of 
freedom. Following the earlier literature, Devereux et al. (2002) therefore suggest replacing 
the vector   by the weighted average
y it −− ,1
y it −− ,1 A i t ij jt
ji
, =
≠ ∑ω . The assumption is thus that every 
country responds in the same way to the weighted average tax rate. I employ two different 
weights  ωij . The first weight derives naturally from this analysis. Countries are likely to 
respond more to taxes and expenditures of other countries the more they are integrated with   17
the rest of the world.
16 The first weight used here is thus the index of globalization. The 
second weight is the inverse of the number of countries included – in other words, each 
country obtains the same weight. 
The system of equations is thus 
yy G A X it it it it it i it =+ + + + + + −− α β γ γ η η ε 11 2 1 ''  (3) 
The fixed period effects are excluded from the system, as they are largely included in 
the weighted average and the lagged dependent variable (see Devereux et al., 2002, for 
details). Note that the weighted average enters the regressions with a lag. From a theoretical 
perspective this is preferable, as it takes time for a country to respond to changes in other 
countries’ policies. Econometrically, this allows estimation without instrumenting the 
potentially endogenous contemporaneous average policy variables (Devereux et al. 2002). 
All previous regressions have been replicated with the lagged average of the respective 
policy variable for all countries (other than i) included. In no case are there substantial 
changes, with the average policy variables always being insignificant. The tables therefore 
only report the (OLS-)results for capital taxes. In addition to the tax ratios by Carey and 
Rabesona (used so far), the tables include results when the Devereux/ Griffith and Volkerink/ 
de Haan measures for the burden of capital taxation are used instead. All equations are 
estimated with and without the lagged dependent variable included in the regression. 
As can be seen from columns 1-4 of Table 6, including the (lagged) average of other 
countries’ tax rates to explain the Carey/ Rabesona tax ratios produces results similar to those 
reported in Table 5. At the ten percent level of significance capital tax rates are higher with 
higher economic integration – at the five percent level at least, they rise with social 
integration. In no regression is the weighted or unweighted average of other countries’ taxes 
significant – whether or not the lagged dependent variable is included. 
                                                           
 
16 Arguing along similar lines, Devereux et al. (2002) employ countries’ openness to international flows.   18
 
Columns 9-12 of Table 6 contain results for the capital tax ratios taken from Volkerink 
and de Haan (2001). At the five percent level at least, capital tax ratios are higher with higher 
economic integration in all regressions. When the lagged endogenous variable is excluded, tax 
ratios also rise with political integration, which is in line with the a priori hypothesis. Political 
integration implies political collusion, leading to higher tax rates on capital. It is interesting to 
note that the dummy for left governments is significant at (least at) the ten percent level, with 
the expected sign. 
As Table 7 shows, the results regarding the impact of integration on capital taxation 
are rather different when the adjusted statutory tax rates proposed by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003) are used as dependent variables instead. Columns 1-4 report results for the effective 
average rate, while results for the effective marginal rate are reported in columns 5-8. In five 
out of eight regressions the coefficient of economic integration is again significant, but with a 
negative sign. There is also evidence that taxation is lower with more social integration. It 
seems that there might be some degree of competition over the adjusted statutory rates, that is 
not reflected in the implicit rates. Statutory rates might be more sensitive as they are more 
important for politicians to attract capital (Hansson and Olofsdotter 2003). Comparing the 
results for the adjusted statutory tax rates with those for the implicit rates suggests that 
changes are made to statutory rates as a consequence of economic and social integration, and 




Globalization has been severely criticized as being responsible for a shift in tax burden 
from mobile capital to immobile labor. Critics also claim that although the OECD countries’ 
actual spending did on average increase over the last 30 years, spending (and taxes on capital)   19
 
would be higher without globalization, because the economic environment deteriorated since 
the seventies. 
This paper did not make specific policy recommendations. Instead it tested whether, 
overall, globalization has the effects its critics claim. It analyzed the influence of globalization 
on the OECD countries’ tax and expenditure policies in the last 30 years. Contrary to previous 
studies, the analysis not only took economic but also social and cultural integration explicitly 
into account. For the first time in such analysis, potential endogeneity of the regressors has 
been allowed for. 
The results showed that only tax rates on capital have been influenced by 
globalization. While the positive effect of globalization on average effective capital tax rates 
could be due to the dominance of political integration over economic integration, the 
disaggregated analysis showed that economic integration is responsible for this positive 
relationship – a result that is supported by theoretical models and is most likely due to 
agglomeration forces allowing governments to increase tax rates on capital as a consequence 
of reduced transportation costs. The results for average effective tax rates are in stark contrast 
to those achieved for (average and marginal) tax rates based on tax legislation. Regarding 
these adjusted statutory rates, globalization indeed leads to competition. 
The results also showed that few economic variables robustly influence tax rates – 
probably because decisions to change taxes are dominated by political considerations. This 
remains an avenue for future research.   20
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Table 1: Components of the Index of Globalization 
A.  Data on Economic Integration  [35%] 
  i) Actual Flows  (50%) 
       Trade (in percent of GDP)  (23%) 
       Foreign Direct Investment (in percent of GDP)  (29%) 
       Portfolio Investment (in percent of GDP)  (27%) 
       Income payments to foreign nationals (in percent of GDP)  (22%) 
 ii)  Restrictions  (50%) 
       Hidden Import Barriers  (20%) 
       Mean Tariff Rate  (30%) 
       Taxes on International Trade (in percent of current revenue)  (24%) 
       Capital Account Restrictions  (26%) 
B.  Data on Political Engagement  [28%] 
       Embassies in Country  (34%) 
       Membership in International Organizations  (34%) 
       Participation in UN Security Council Missions  (32%) 
C.  Data on Social Globalization  [38%] 
  i) Data on Personal Contact  (24%) 
       Outgoing telephone traffic  (31%) 
       Transfers (in percent of GDP)  (9%) 
       International Tourism  (1%) 
       Telephone Average Costs of Call to USA  (33%) 
       Foreign Population (in percent of total population)  (26%) 
  ii) Data on Information Flows  (39%) 
       Telephone Mainlines (per 1000 people)  (18%) 
       Internet Hosts (per capita)  (15%) 
       Internet Users (as a share of population)  (18%) 
       Cable Television (per 1000 people)  (16%) 
       Daily Newspapers (per 1000 people)  (16%) 
       Radios (per 1000 people)  (17%) 
  iii) Data on Cultural Proximity  (37%) 
       Number of McDonald’s Restaurants (per capita)  (100%) 
Notes:   The number in parenthesis indicates the weight used to derive the indices. Weights may not 
sum to 100 because of rounding.  
Source: Dreher (2003).  
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Table 2: Index of Globalization 
 






 1975  1980  1985 1990 1995 2000   2000   
USA 4.56 4.61  4.53 4.50 6.09 6.48 7.88  6.90  4.92
Canada 5.49 4.99  4.65 4.79 5.67 6.26 7.61  6.28  5.17
Sweden 5.18 4.53  4.56 5.00 5.36 6.00 7.85  5.00  5.62
Finland 4.32 4.25  4.15 4.12 4.75 5.71 6.79  4.97  5.67
Denmark 5.28 4.63  4.38 4.23 4.55 5.69 7.26  4.60  5.63
Luxembourg 5.45 4.97  5.46 5.34 5.37 5.61 2.21  5.10  8.84
Belgium 6.30 5.33  5.40 5.43 5.24 5.48 7.33  3.49  6.18
Switzerland 4.86 4.61  5.32 5.13 4.76 5.44 5.63 4.81  5.96
UK 5.04 4.73  4.68 4.74 4.64 5.44 7.04  3.73  6.01
France 4.24 4.15  4.15 4.14 4.61 5.36 8.58  3.17  5.19
Norway 4.37 4.32  4.01 4.22 4.66 5.35 6.62  4.45  5.31
Netherlands 5.31 4.69  4.47 4.42 4.77 5.31 5.52  4.08  6.46
Germany 4.26 4.04  4.57 4.27 4.36 5.20 6.99  3.70  5.38
Austria 4.44 4.54  4.15 4.31 4.47 5.10 6.75  3.61  5.39
Australia 3.58 3.38  3.29 4.06 4.64 5.03 4.37  5.92  4.60
Ireland 3.59 3.63  3.62 3.85 4.04 4.95 4.92  3.30  6.75
New Zealand  3.31 3.24  3.12 3.38 4.06 4.91 3.35  5.70  5.30
Italy 4.14 3.83  3.82 3.80 3.90 4.50 7.05  2.05  5.11
Japan 3.92 3.56  3.54 3.75 3.63 4.38 4.84  4.24  4.16
Portugal 2.23 2.49  2.30 2.63 3.10 4.10 4.88  2.12  5.61
Spain 2.85 2.85  2.84 3.13 3.65 3.95 5.31  1.96  5.01
Iceland 3.49 2.94  2.91 2.97 3.07 3.90 2.05  4.35  4.87
Czech  Rep.  .  . . .  2.91 3.75 4.48  2.19  4.86
Poland 2.77 2.95  3.58 2.71 2.79 3.74 6.30  1.93  3.65
Greece 3.01 2.90  2.69 2.73 2.90 3.70 4.30  2.27  4.76
Hungary 2.77 2.36  2.39 2.43 3.22 3.49 4.16  2.28  4.26
Korea, Rep.  2.71 2.52  2.33 3.04 2.99 3.25 3.65  2.39  3.86
Turkey 1.85 1.60  1.71 1.96 2.68 3.18 4.22  1.62  4.04
Slovak  Rep.  .  . . .  2.35 3.06 2.80  1.94  4.48
Mexico 2.19 2.32  1.92 2.36 2.62 2.88 3.44  1.40  4.03
 
Notes: All indices range between 0 (not globalized) and 10 (globalized). Countries are ranked 
by their overall globalization score in the year 2000. See Appendix A for details.  
Table 3: Globalization and Economic Policy (1970-2000, OLS AR(1), static model) 
 
  Government 
spending, total 
Government 
spending, social  Taxes on labor  Taxes on 
consumption  Taxes on capital 
Index of Globalization  -0.31  -0.11                  -0.60 -0.97 -0.08 0.05 -0.47 -0.34 1.97 3.41
 (0.74)  (0.83) (0.28)  (1.65)   (0.10)   (0.06)   (1.06)          
                   
               
                     
           
                     
               
                   
           




-1.00 -10.43 12.76  4.51 -31.76
(0.17) (0.91) (0.73)  (0.45)  (0.90)
Unemployment  (percent)
 
0.21 0.50 0.28 -0.03 0.21
(3.99*) (5.75*)  (2.05**) (0.37)  (0.86)
Government  employment 0.62 -0.03 0.17 0.17 0.79
     (relative to all employment)    (4.66*)   (0.11)    (0.47)    (0.87)    (1.48) 
Costs of Trade 
 
  2.94    3.77    8.79    -5.72    1.80 
(0.77) (0.70) (0.74)  (1.17)  (0.48)
Economic  growth
 
-0.17 -0.31 -0.29  0.05 -0.17
(2.36**) (2.83*)  (1.50)  (0.45)  (0.46)
Left governments, Dummy 
 
  0.09    0.16    -0.11    0.13    -1.81 
(0.35) (0.40) (0.17)  (0.36)  (1.56)
Number of countries  30  26  29  26  23  22  25  24  24  22 
Number of observations  139  85  102  85  79  70  91  82  77  66 
R
2 (within)                    0.25 0.73 0.32 0.73 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.40
 
Notes:   All Regressions contain individual intercepts for each country and period. Standard errors are estimated robustly. 





Table 4: Globalization and Economic Policy (1970-2000, OLS and GMM, dynamic model) 
  Government 
spending, total 
Government spending, 
social  Taxes on labor  Taxes on 
consumption  Taxes on capital 
                     
                     
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
Index  of  Globalization 0.14 -0.16 -0.73 -0.74 0.03 0.51 -0.67 -0.68 3.34 2.73
  (0.35)                 
                     
                   
                     
                   
                     
             
                     
               
                   
                   
               
                   
(0.40) (1.04) (1.10) (0.04) (0.48) (1.15) (1.03) (2.61**) (1.74
o) 
Dependency  ratio -8.51 -9.56 -13.45 -2.92 -0.55 -6.00 -0.75 -10.57 -35.99 -54.57
(1.71
o) (2.34**)  (1.61) (0.30) (0.05) (0.47) (0.12) (1.43) (2.18**) (1.44)
Unemployment  (percent)
 
0.15 0.17 0.47 0.53 0.15 0.30 0.04 -0.01 -0.09 0.15
(2.71*) (3.19*) (4.57*) (4.72*) (1.14) (1.22) (0.51) (0.10) (0.37) (0.30)
Government  employment 0.45 0.29 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.09 -0.05 0.70 1.21
     (relative to all employment)  (4.52*)  (2.56**)  (1.08)  (0.74)  (0.34)  (0.42)  (0.45)  (0.25)  (0.99)  (1.93
o) 
Costs of Trade  1.12  1.16  0.05  0.91  -24.69  -20.71  1.85  4.04  3.43  0.33 
(0.22)  (0.01) (0.32)  (0.16)   (1.95   (1.25)
o) (0.49) (0.74) (0.12) (0.01)
Economic  growth -0.28 -0.25 -0.49 -0.31 -0.66 -0.42 0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.03
(3.24*)  (2.59**) (3.00*)  (1.65   (3.78*)
o) (1.28) (0.53) (0.49) (0.14) (0.08)
Left governments, Dummy 
 
0.20  0.52  0.24  0.37  -0.27  -0.41  0.71  1.00  -2.03  -1.37 
(0.75) (1.60) (0.43) (0.68) (0.25) (0.48) (1.48) (2.11**)
 
(1.32) (1.03)
Lagged  endogenous  variable
 
0.35 0.33 0.26 0.06 0.60 0.02 0.49 0.08 0.11 -0.21
(3.01*)  (1.42) (2.02**)  (0.17) (5.38*) (0.05) (4.15*) (0.28) (0.72) (0.38)
Number of countries  28 27 26 25 22 21 24 21 22 19
Number of observations  115                   
                 
                   
                    
86 89 62 71 49 83 59 67 45
R
2 (within) 0.63 0.81 0.70 0.47 0.53
Sargan-Test  (p-value) 0.0003  0.50 0.67 0.82 0.32
Arellano-Bond-Test  (p-value) 0.03 0.61 0.85 0.50 0.98
Notes:   All regressions contain individual intercepts for each period. The OLS regressions also include an individual intercept for each country.  





Table 5: Dimensions of globalization and economic policy (1970-2000, OLS and GMM, dynamic model) 
  Government 
spending, total 
Government spending, 
social  Taxes on labor  Taxes on consumption Taxes on capital 
                     
                     
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
Economic  Integration 0.22 -0.12 -0.50 -0.69 0.10 0.28 -0.04 -0.59 2.63 3.25
  (0.70)                   
                     
                   
                     
                   
                     
                   
                     
                   
                     
                   
                   
                     
                 
         
                   
               
           
(0.42) (0.90) (1.47) (0.15) (0.33) (0.10) (1.14) (1.69
o) (2.34**)
Social  Integration -0.06 -0.06 -0.30 -0.11 0.23 0.08 -0.27 -0.20 1.34 0.95
  (0.36) (0.25) (1.08) (0.26) (0.60) (0.14) (0.93) (0.62) (1.97**) (1.24)
Political  Integration 0.13 0.01 0.02 -0.69 -0.45 0.35 -0.23 -0.38 0.07 -0.22
  (0.57) (0.04) (0.04) (1.47) (0.63) (0.56) (0.81) (0.90) (0.09) (0.27)
Dependency  ratio -7.26 -9.71 -14.18 -4.71 -0.88 -3.44 0.29 -10.74 -33.23 -47.67
  (1.37) (2.25**) (1.56) (0.47) (0.07) (0.25) (0.04) (1.32) (1.80
o) (1.24)
Unemployment  (percent) 0.15 0.17 0.48 0.54 0.17 0.25 0.03 -0.02 -0.25 -0.04
  (2.66*) (3.01*) (4.58*) (4.68*) (1.32) (1.05) (0.41) (0.20) (0.77) (0.07)
Government  employment 0.43 0.29 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.07 -0.04 0.59 0.94
     (relative to all employment)  (4.27*) (2.47**) (1.23) (1.06) (0.38) (0.43) (0.32) (0.19) (0.84) (1.63)
Costs of Trade  1.06  1.04  -0.05  0.32  -22.76  -21.02  2.11  2.66  12.31  8.93 
  (0.21) (0.28) (0.01) (0.05) (1.96**) (1.25) (0.57) (0.46) (0.37) (0.31)
Economic  growth -0.28 -0.25 -0.48 -0.30 -0.65 -0.48 0.07 0.10 -0.001 0.13
  (3.22*) (2.94*) (2.39**)  (1.55) (3.81*) (1.49) (0.46) (0.68) (0.00) (0.67)
Left governments, Dummy 
 
0.13  0.50  0.12  0.39  -0.02  -0.70  0.70  1.15  -1.71  -1.34 
(0.45)  (0.21) (1.50)  (0.74)   (0.02)   (0.77)   (1.37) (2.03**)
 
(1.11) (0.98)
Lagged  endogenous  variable
 
0.33 0.36 0.25 0.06 0.58 0.15 0.47 0.35 0.10 -0.22
(2.86*)
 











Number  of  countries 28 27 26 25 22 21 24 21 22 19
Number  of  observations
 
                     
             
                   
                     




83 59 67 45
R
2 (within) 0.64 0.81 0.70 0.47
Sargan-Test  (p-value) 0.0005  0.62 0.50 0.49 0.46
Arellano-Bond-Test  (p-value) 0.04 0.56 0.93 0.91 0.79
Notes:   All regressions contain individual intercepts for each period. The OLS regressions also include an individual intercept for each country.  





Table 6: Dimensions of globalization and taxes on capital (1970-2000, OLS, static and dynamic models) 
        Carey/Rabesona Volkerink/de Haan
     
                 
(1)  (3) (2)  (4)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)
Economic  Integration 2.57 2.21 2.61 2.25 2.39 3.12 2.18 2.90
  (1.85
o)               
               
               
             
             
               
               
                 
               
               
               
               
       
            
               




o) (2.47**) (3.98*) (2.22**) (3.49*)
Social Integration  1.36  1.46  1.39  1.49  -0.17  -0.35  -0.23  -0.50 
  (2.64*) (3.22*) (2.59**)
 
(3.18*) (0.39) (0.80) (0.52) (1.19)
Political  Integration 0.20 -0.03 0.26 0.06 0.36 0.70 0.35 0.77
  (0.34) (0.04) (0.42) (0.10) (0.82) (2.15**)
 
  (0.79) (2.08**)
  Dependency  ratio -32.69 -29.30 -32.80 -30.12 -5.73 -12.66 -1.46 -6.28
  (1.94
o) (2.17**) (2.90*) (2.21**) (0.44) (0.87) (0.14) (0.50)
Unemployment (percent)  -0.23  -0.28  -0.23  -0.27  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.01 
  (0.80) (1.17) (0.78) (1.15) (0.36) (0.46) (0.17) (0.11)
Government  employment 0.57 0.76 0.55 0.75 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.43
     (relative to all employment)  (0.86) (1.93
o) (0.82) (1.94
o) (1.46) (1.24) (1.41) (1.23)
Costs  of  Trade -10.99  -7.91 -9.24 -7.65 -0.52 1.50 -0.77 1.54
  (0.36) (0.38) (0.31) (0.37) (0.09) (0.24) (0.13) (0.26)
Economic growth  -0.03  -0.13  -0.05  -0.14  0.20  0.07  0.30  0.22 
  (0.12) (0.56) (0.17) (0.61) (0.67) (0.20) (1.21) (0.79)
Left governments, Dummy 
 
-1.74  -2.54  -1.75  -2.56  1.66  1.64  1.62  1.58 






Lagged endogenous variable 
 
0.09    0.09    0.23    0.26   
(0.61) (0.61) (1.41) (1.68
o)
Average Tax Ratio, t-1 (unweighted) 
 
-0.31  -0.17      -0.45  -0.78     
(0.78) (0.44) (0.80) (1.49)
Average Tax Ratio, t-1 (weighted) 
 
    -0.07  -0.05      -0.05  -0.09 
(0.70) (0.53) (0.54) (0.98)
Number of countries  22  22  22  22  15  15  15  15 
Number of observations 
 
67  74  67  74  73  73  73  73 
R
2 (within) 0.56                0.47 0.56 0.47 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.62
Notes:   All Regressions contain individual intercepts for each country. Standard errors are estimated robustly. 








Table 7: Dimensions of globalization and taxes on capital (1970-2000, OLS, static and dynamic models) 
  Devereux/ Griffith (average rate)  Devereux/ Griffith (marginal rate) 
                 
                 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic  Integration -3.42 -8.23 -3.58 -7.96 -3.37 -6.64 -4.08 -7.36
  (1.25)               
                 
             
           
               
         
             
                 
               
                 
               
         
               
               
               
   
               
               
(3.85*) (1.33) (4.17*) (1.61) (2.90*) (1.87
o) (3.19*)
Social  Integration -1.60 -3.06 -1.70 -2.83 -0.90 -0.22 -1.51 -3.01






(0.61) (0.21) (1.02) (1.81
o) 
Political  Integration 0.77 0.94 0.89 1.29 0.02 -2.09 0.34 -0.82
  (1.13) (0.97) (1.31) (1.32) (0.02) (1.21) (0.34) (0.85)
Dependency ratio  -14.23  -65.84  -23.47  -81.25 -54.26 -58.24 -50.50 -48.53
  (0.39) (1.94
o) (0.60) (2.42**)  (1.59) (1.74
o) (1.44) (1.43)
Unemployment  (percent) -0.78 -0.83 -0.71 -0.74 -0.77 -0.86 -0.74 -0.84
  (2.33**) (2.23**) (2.23**) (1.96
o) (2.24**) (2.31**) (2.18**) (2.26**)
Government  employment 1.08 0.13 1.19 0.23 0.24 -0.05 0.46 0.23
     (relative to all employment)  (1.14) (0.11) (1.29) (0.20) (0.27) (0.05) (0.53) (0.23)
Costs of Trade  -16.60  -11.99  -15.80  -10.89 -20.91 -20.44 -22.02 -21.46
  (0.85) (0.58) (0.93) (0.61) (0.78) (0.87) (0.78) (0.88)
Economic growth  0.14  -0.29  0.08  -0.38  0.35  0.17  0.37  0.23 
  (0.28) (0.53) (0.15) (0.74) (0.52) (0.27) (0.54) (0.35)
Left governments, Dummy 
 
1.04  1.85  1.28  2.12  1.65  1.57  1.95  1.91 
(0.52) (0.80) (0.65) (0.95) (0.76) (0.66) (0.89) (0.81)
Lagged endogenous variable 
 
0.43    0.43    0.30    0.29   
(2.69**)    (2.56**)    (2.75*)    (2.55**)
Average Tax Ratio, t-1 (unweighted) 
 
-0.10  -0.51      0.31  0.29     
(0.21) (1.07) (1.09) (0.78)
Average Tax Ratio, t-1 (weighted) 
 
    -0.09  -0.21      0.03  0.04 
(0.77) (1.59) (0.26) (0.30)
Number of countries  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18 
Number of observations 
 
63  68  63  68  63  68  63  68 
R
2 (within) 0.62                0.56 0.63 0.58 0.65 0.58 0.64 0.57
Notes:   All Regressions contain individual intercepts for each country. Standard errors are estimated robustly. 
  t-statistics in brackets: significant at the 1-percent-level (*), 5-percent-level (**) and 10-percent-level (
o)  
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Appendix A: Construction of the Index of Globalization (Dreher 2003) 
 
To construct the indices of globalization, each variable (of Table 1) has been 
transformed to an index with a zero to ten scale, whereas higher values denote more 
globalization. When higher values of the original variable indicate higher globalization, the 
formula ((Vi-Vmin)/(Vmax-Vmin)*10) has been used for transformation. Conversely, when 
higher values indicate less globalization, the formula is ((Vmax-Vi)/(Vmax-Vmin)*10). This is 
the procedure employed by Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2002) in the construction of their 
economic freedom index. The weights for the sub-indices are calculated using principal 
components analysis. The year 2000 is used as the base year. For this year, the analysis 
partitions the variance of the variables used. The weights are then determined in a way that 
maximizes the variation of the resulting principal component, so that the index captures the 
variation as fully as possible.  
If possible, the weights determined for the base year are then used to calculate the 
indices for each single year back to 1970. Where no data are available, the weights are 
readjusted to correct for this. 
   33
 
Appendix B: Definitions 
Government Expenditure, total:  General government final consumption expenditure 
(percent of GDP). 
  
Government Expenditure, social:  Public Social Expenditure in percent of GDP. 
  
Effective tax rates on labor, 
consumption and capital: 
Actual revenue in relation to tax base. 
  
Average adjusted statutory tax 
rate on capital: 
Average effective tax rates based on analysis of the 
legislation underlying different tax regimes. 
  
Marginal adjusted statutory tax 
rate on capital: 
Marginal effective tax rates based on analysis of the 
legislation underlying different tax regimes. 
  
Dependency ratio:  Dependents to working-age population. 
  
Unemployment (percent):  Total unemployment in percent of total labor force. 
  
Government employment:   General government employment (producers of 
government services) as a percent of working age 
population. 
  
Costs of Trade:  Value of imports c.i.f. relative to value of imports f.o.b. 
  
Economic Growth:  Real GDP growth in percent. 
  
Left Governments, Dummy:  Dummy with the value 1, if chief executive is from a left 
party and zero otherwise.   34
 
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources 
Variable Source    Average  Std.  Dev. 
Index of Globalization Dreher (2003)  overall  4.02  1.08
   between   0.99
   within    0.46
Economic Dreher  (2003)  overall  4.71  1.21
Integration   between    1.03
   within    0.61
Political Integration  Dreher (2003)  overall  2.60  1.42
   between   1.21
   within    0.76
Social Integration  Dreher (2003)  overall  5.11  1.71
   between   1.59
   within    0.71
Government   World Bank (2002)  overall  17.85  4.72
Spending, total    between    4.47
   within    1.50
Government   OECD (2003)  overall  19.66  7.18
Spending, social    between    6.93
   within    2.58
Effective Taxes on   Carey and   overall  16.71  5.28
Consumption Rabesona  (2002)  between    5.16
   within    1.40
Effective Taxes on   Carey and   overall  26.42  7.83
Capital Rabesona  (2002)  between    7.79
   within    2.88
Effective Taxes on   Volkerink and  overall  20.26  6.19
Capital  de Haan (2001)  between    5.60
   within    2.92
Effective Taxes on   Carey and   overall  30.41  9.55
Labor Rabesona  (2002)  between    9.14
   within    2.75
Average adjusted   Devereux and  overall  25.42  10.51
statutory tax rate   Griffith (2003)  between    8.63
on capital    within    5.96
Marginal adjusted   Devereux and  overall  35.32  10.28
statutory tax rate   Griffith (2003)  between    7.64
on capital    within    6.48
Dependency  World Bank (2002)  overall  0.54  0.09
Ratio   between    0.07
   within    0.05
Unemployment  World Bank (2002)  overall  6.11  4.05
(percent) European  between    3.19
 Commission  (2003)  within    2.70
Government   Cusack (1998)  overall  10.87  5.72
Employment OECD  (2000)  between   6.63
   within    1.41
Costs of Trade  IMF (2003)  overall  1.0004  0.22
   between   0.21
   within    0.03  35
 
Appendix C (continued) 
Variable Source   Average  Std.  Dev.
Economic Growth  World Bank (2002)  overall  2.38  1.71
   between   1.08
   within    1.37
Left Governments,  Beck et al. (2001)  overall  0.45  0.42
Dummy   between    0.31
   within    0.29
 